Dangote Cement Plc (DANGCE.ng) listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange under the Building & Associated sector has released it’s 2012 presentation For more information about Dangote Cement Plc (DANGCE.ng) reports, abridged reports, interim earnings results and earnings presentations, visit the Dangote Cement Plc (DANGCE.ng) company page on AfricanFinancials.Document: Dangote Cement Plc (DANGCE.ng) 2012 presentation Company ProfileDangote Cement Plc manufactures, packages and distributes cement and related products for the limestone mining, coal production and property investment sectors in Nigeria and the rest of Africa. The company has operations in Nigeria, Benin and Ghana, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia and exports internationally. Dangote Cement Plc operates the largest cement plant in sub-Saharan Africa, the Obajana Cement Plant. Cement bagged and distributed by Dangote Cement Plc is required of the limestone mining, coal production and property investment sectors. Formerly known as Obajana Cement Plc, the company changed its name to Dangote Cement Plc in 2010. The company is a subsidiary of Dangote Industries Limited. Its head office is in Lagos, Nigeria. Dangote Cement Plc is listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange
El Rdo. Nathan Ferrel, capellán de la reserva en la Armada de EE.UU. fue nombrado el 23 de abril de 2017. Foto de la Oficina del Obispo para las Fuerzas Armadas y los Ministerios Federales.[Episcopal News Service] Joshua Woods sintió su primer llamado mientras ministraba a los pacientes en fase terminal en Fort Walton Beach, Florida.Muchos pacientes eran veteranos de las Fuerzas Armadas y sus cónyuges. Mientras les administraba atención pastoral, Woods, un capellán laico, se enteraba del impacto que habían tenido en sus vidas los capellanes militares.Fue entonces que Woods, que ahora tiene 34 años, se persuadió de que quería convertirse en capellán militar. Tal capellán es un miembro del clero que le ofrece orientación espiritual, consejería y servicios religiosos a una institución diferente a una parroquia, tal como puede ser una prisión, una universidad, un hospital o una rama de las fuerzas armadas.Pero el proceso para convertirse en capellán militar es particularmente arduo. Woods no conocía de ningún seminario que tuvieran una especialidad en capellanía militar, existen tantos requisitos, lo mismo de parte de la Iglesia como de las fuerzas armadas, que puede resultar un camino a seguir tedioso y frustrante.“Una de las razones por las cuales resultaba un camino largo y tortuoso para mí era porque lo estaba haciendo sin orientación”, dijo Woods, aunque él sí obtuvo ayuda del Rdo. Dave Scheider, capellán del Ejército durante 25 años y actualmente jubilado, que era profesor del Seminario del Sudoeste en Austin, Texas.Woods cursa ahora su cuarto año [de licenciatura en Teología] en ese seminario episcopal, pero a los que vengan tras él debe resultarles más fácil. El 12 de septiembre, el Seminario del Sudoeste anunció que iniciaba una especialización en capellanía militar para su maestría en teología. Esa es la primera de este tipo entre los seminarios episcopales.El seminario no creó esta especialización de la nada, dijo Eric Scott, director de comunicaciones y mercadeo del seminario. Durante 15 años, el Seminario del Sudoeste ha sido el único seminario episcopal que ofrece un diploma de maestría acreditado en salud mental para estudiantes que han de graduarse de consejeros profesionales, explicó Scott. Es un diploma clínico, completamente separado del mundo religioso.El contraalmirante retirado Don Muchow (izquierda) y dos reclutadores militares durante el evento del 12 de septiembre en que se dio a conocer la nueva especialización en capellanía militar en el Seminario del Sudoeste en Austin, Texas. Foto del Seminario del Sudoeste.“Debido a estas clases de consejería, y porque gran parte de lo que los capellanes militares hacen en la práctica es atención de la salud mental, el lado pastoral, podemos ofrecer algunas clases electivas de esos temas específicos, tales como estas clases de consejería, para tratar el síndrome postraumático, la adicción y la recuperación —todas las cosas que sabemos que tienen que enfrentar los soldados”, dijo Scott.Los seminaristas que siguen la vía de la capellanía militar, tomarán los mismos cursos obligatorios de sus compañeros que hacen la maestría en teología, en tanto aprovechan sus cursos electivos para la especialización.También ayuda que el seminario se encuentra a menos de 160 kilómetros de tres de las mayores bases militares del país, donde los seminaristas pueden hacer las prácticas obligatorias en parroquias cercanas que apoyen a las fuerzas armadas y sus familias: Fort Hood, del Ejército de EE.UU. en Kileen, y las bases Lackland y Randolph de la Fuerza Aérea.El Rvdmo. Carl Wright, obispo sufragáneo para las Fuerzas Armadas y los Ministerios Federales, visitó el campus de Austin cuando se anunció formalmente el programa. Él brinda supervisión eclesiástica a 130 capellanes militares episcopales que se encuentran en la nómina federal y le encantaría duplicar esa cifra si hubiera suficientes sacerdotes adiestrados y llamados a ese ministerio. Él ve el crecimiento de ministerios especializados como una tendencia en la Iglesia Episcopal.“La especialización militar de la Maestría en Teología es una innovación, y es la onda del futuro en nuestra Iglesia, porque siempre hemos sabido que todo el mundo no siente el llamado específicamente al ministerio parroquial”, dijo Wright, en recuerdo de su visita. Él encomia al Seminario del Sudoeste “no sólo por el reconocimiento de otros llamados, sino también por crear una vía para que nosotros los procuremos”.La Rda. Hope Benko, directora de reclutamiento, y el Rvdmo. Carl Wright, obispo sufragáneo para las Fuerzas Armadas y los Ministerios Federales, asistieron el 12 de septiembre al evento inaugural en el Seminario del Sudoeste. Foto del Seminario del Sudoeste.Estos seminaristas recibirán adiestramiento en prevención de suicidios, consejería de matrimonio y relaciones y ministrarán a los soldados con síndrome del estrés postraumático, problemas de adicción y otros tipos de crisis. El diploma también conlleva trabajo práctico en los hospitales de veteranos y otras instalaciones médicas.Hay escasez de capellanes episcopales en las fuerzas armadas, donde aquellos que no responden a creencias más conservadores se encuentran necesitados de orientación y consejería espirituales, dijo Scheider. Él supervisa tres de los programas graduados del seminario concebidos para laicos y clérigos en consejería, capellanía y formación espiritual. Scheider supervisará a los estudiantes de capellanía militar.“La competencia para ministrar a todo el mundo, en unidades que abarcan todo el espectro político y teológico, exige mucho. Es realmente difícil de hacer, y eso es lo que deseamos que se preparen para hacer”, afirmó Scheider.Él quiere capellanes que entren en las fuerzas armadas equipados para dominar la cultura y las presiones políticas, tales como poder aconsejar a los jóvenes soldados, con frecuencia provenientes de las minorías, que se incorporan a los grados inferiores para salir de la pobreza. Los capellanes también deben ganarse el respeto de los oficiales de alto rango que tienden a ser más conservadores, dijo Scheider.Hay un aumento de las minorías sexuales en las fuerzas armadas, pero un decremento en el número de capellanes de denominaciones que son más tolerantes con sus creencias y estilos de vida, siguió diciendo. Durante la semana en que los capellanes no están dirigiendo oficios religiosos, aconsejan a personas que atraviesan por serios problemas y, si bien ellos no son oficialmente consejeros de salud mental, podrían ser los miembros más valiosos de la unidad.El Rdo. Dave Scheider, el Rvdmo. Carl Wright y el Rdo. David Peters, un ex alumno del Seminario del Sudoeste y capellán del Ejército de EE.UU., asistieron al evento del anuncio el 12 de septiembre en el seminario. Foto del Seminario del Sudoeste.“Todo lo que tienen que hacer es dirigirse a un capellán y decirle: ‘hola, dispone usted de un minuto’”, dijo Scheider, y el soldado puede esperar completa confidencialidad, incluso si hubiera un intento de suicidio. Los capellanes se consideran clérigos, no profesionales de la salud, y por tanto no están sujetos a las mismas excepciones a lo dictaminado por la Ley [federal] de Transferencia y Responsabilidad de Seguro Médico (HIPPA, por su sigla en inglés) como tampoco a las excepciones estatales, que exigen o permiten revelar serias e inminentes ideas de los pacientes de atentar contra sí mismos. Estas reglas, requisitos y excepciones, junto con la responsabilidad que conllevan, pueden ser complicadas, pero el objetivo es resguardar a la persona que busca ayuda, y brindar la suficiente confianza para lograrlo.“Los capellanes son en extremo prudentes para que los soldados sencillamente abran su corazón y no experimenten ningún resultado negativo [por ello]”, apuntó Scheider.En esta última década de servicio militar activo, Scheider se especializó en ayudar a parejas que habían tenido relaciones extramaritales, una porción de los cuales se casaban jóvenes para salir de los dormitorios militares y recibir beneficios. Él obtuvo diplomas adicionales de consejería y una licencia en terapia matrimonial y de familia para realizar mejor esa tarea.“Todas las parejas deben tener ese nivel de apoyo y no verse discriminadas, y nosotros somos una de las pocas denominaciones que alentamos a nuestros capellanes a ofrecer ese tipo de apoyo a parejas del mismo sexo”, dijo él.Sobre todo, Scheider y Woods coincidieron en que un capellán militar debe ser primero sacerdote y en segundo lugar militar. Es por eso que es tan importante una base firme en el seminario.Hasta ahora, no ha habido ninguna ruta específica dentro de un seminario episcopal para estudiantes que quieran prepararse para llegar a ser capellanes militares en lugar de servir en una parroquia. La Iglesia Episcopal sí tiene un programa para seminaristas que aspiren a convertirse en “candidatos a capellanes”. Entran en las reserva para adiestrase durante sus vacaciones de verano entre el tercer y cuarto años del seminario. Esos candidatos a capellanes continúan adiestrándose y ejercitándose como reservistas hasta que terminan su período obligatorio de experiencia parroquial (hasta dos años), según la Rda. Leslie Núñez Steffensen, canóniga del Obispo de las Fuerzas Armadas y Ministerios Federales.Los seminaristas o clérigos interesados deben entrar en el proceso de reclutamiento de capellanes militares de EE.UU. y, en un determinado momento, recibir el llamado respaldo eclesiástico de su denominación.El Rdo. Todd Delaney, capellán de las Fuerzas Armadas de EE UU, desempeñando sus deberes no importa donde esté destacado. Foto de la Oficina del Obispo para las Fuerzas Armadas y los Ministerios Federales.Algunas personas estuvieron primero en las fuerzas armadas, y luego se fueron para ser ordenadas y hacer su adiestramiento de capellanía en un seminario. Otros se hicieron primero sacerdotes, y después ingresaron en las fuerzas armadas. El Ejército de EE.UU., por ejemplo, resalta tres de los principales requisitos: recibir un respaldo eclesiástico, obtener una licenciatura y ser un estudiante graduado de curso regular en un seminario o escuela de teología.En el caso de Woods, él tuvo que descubrir primero que quería ser episcopal. Anteriormente, había trabajado como capellán laico y pastor auxiliar en una iglesia no denominacional. Antes de eso, había obtenido una maestría en estudios teológicos de la Universidad de Vanderbilt, y eso fue conforme a la doctrina de la Iglesia de su infancia, las Asambleas de Dios. Pero, en la medida en que maduraba, Woods fue encontrando restrictiva esa denominación, y le encanta la apertura al cuestionamiento y el carácter inclusivo de la Iglesia Episcopal.Se convenció, en su primera visita a una iglesia episcopal —San Simón del Canal [St. Simon’s on the Sound] en Fort Walton Beach—, cuando vio, en el estacionamiento, durante la elección presidencial de Obama-Romney, casi igual número de pegatinas de parachoques republicanas y demócratas.Los capellanes deben sentirse cómodos con la diversidad y el multiculturalismo para hacer un buen trabajo en las fuerzas armadas, dijo Scheider. Esa misma clase de acogida, de espíritu de aceptación, es lo primero que atrajo a Woods a la Iglesia Episcopal, y porque los militares necesitan más capellanes episcopales con una base firme en ambos mundos, afirman él y Woods.“En las fuerzas armadas, serás sacerdote o pastor para algunos, pero serás capellán para todos”, dijo Woods. “Todos los que atiendo no serán episcopales. Necesitaré un juego de herramientas diferente para atender a todas las otras personas con diferentes tipos de creencias”.— Amy Sowder es corresponsal especial de Episcopal News Service y escritora y redactora independiente radicada en Brooklyn, NY. Pueden dirigirse a ella en [email protected] David Paulsen, redactor y reportero de Episcopal News Service, colaboró en este artículo. Pueden dirigirse a él en [email protected] Traducción de Vicente Echerri. Rector Hopkinsville, KY Submit a Press Release Rector Albany, NY Associate Rector Columbus, GA Associate Rector for Family Ministries Anchorage, AK Assistant/Associate Rector Washington, DC Rector Collierville, TN Director of Administration & Finance Atlanta, GA Rector and Chaplain Eugene, OR Ya no son extranjeros: Un diálogo acerca de inmigración Una conversación de Zoom June 22 @ 7 p.m. ET This Summer’s Anti-Racism Training Online Course (Diocese of New Jersey) June 18-July 16 Episcopal Migration Ministries’ Virtual Prayer Vigil for World Refugee Day Facebook Live Prayer Vigil June 20 @ 7 p.m. ET El Seminario del Sudoeste facilita el camino a la capellanía militar Episcopal Charities of the Diocese of New York Hires Reverend Kevin W. VanHook, II as Executive Director Episcopal Charities of the Diocese of New York Tags Bishop Diocesan Springfield, IL In-person Retreat: Thanksgiving Trinity Retreat Center (West Cornwall, CT) Nov. 24-28 Priest-in-Charge Lebanon, OH Curate (Associate & Priest-in-Charge) Traverse City, MI Youth Minister Lorton, VA Virtual Celebration of the Jerusalem Princess Basma Center Zoom Conversation June 19 @ 12 p.m. ET Submit a Job Listing Seminary of the Southwest announces appointment of two new full time faculty members Seminary of the Southwest Rector Knoxville, TN Missioner for Disaster Resilience Sacramento, CA Associate Priest for Pastoral Care New York, NY Rector Martinsville, VA Rector Smithfield, NC Assistant/Associate Priest Scottsdale, AZ Por Amy SowderPosted Oct 16, 2017 AddThis Sharing ButtonsShare to PrintFriendlyPrintFriendlyShare to FacebookFacebookShare to TwitterTwitterShare to EmailEmailShare to MoreAddThis TryTank Experimental Lab and York St. John University of England Launch Survey to Study the Impact of Covid-19 on the Episcopal Church TryTank Experimental Lab Inaugural Diocesan Feast Day Celebrating Juneteenth San Francisco, CA (and livestream) June 19 @ 2 p.m. PT Rector Belleville, IL Rector (FT or PT) Indian River, MI Rector Pittsburgh, PA Join the Episcopal Diocese of Texas in Celebrating the Pauli Murray Feast Online Worship Service June 27 Assistant/Associate Rector Morristown, NJ Theological Education An Evening with Presiding Bishop Curry and Iconographer Kelly Latimore Episcopal Migration Ministries via Zoom June 23 @ 6 p.m. ET Featured Events Press Release Service Rector Washington, DC Rector/Priest in Charge (PT) Lisbon, ME Rector Tampa, FL Curate Diocese of Nebraska Featured Jobs & Calls New Berrigan Book With Episcopal Roots Cascade Books Family Ministry Coordinator Baton Rouge, LA Remember Holy Land Christians on Jerusalem Sunday, June 20 American Friends of the Episcopal Diocese of Jerusalem Director of Music Morristown, NJ Submit an Event Listing Cathedral Dean Boise, ID Rector Bath, NC Rector Shreveport, LA The Church Pension Fund Invests $20 Million in Impact Investment Fund Designed to Preserve Workforce Housing Communities Nationwide Church Pension Group Priest Associate or Director of Adult Ministries Greenville, SC The Church Investment Group Commends the Taskforce on the Theology of Money on its report, The Theology of Money and Investing as Doing Theology Church Investment Group Course Director Jerusalem, Israel Canon for Family Ministry Jackson, MS
…And Why Are They Important?From Florida Hospital – Apopka A person filling out a form titled Advance Health Care Directive and a pen. Notes: Very shallow focus on the word ‘Health”. Form created for photo using text in public domain. Free webinar for job seekers on best interview answers, hosted by Goodwill June 11 Please enter your name here Support conservation and fish with NEW Florida specialty license plate LEAVE A REPLY Cancel reply Please enter your comment! TAGSAdvance DirectivesFlorida Hospital – Apopka Previous articleMayor Kilsheimer delivers State of the City address this morningNext articleMayor Kilsheimer: “The State of our city is strong” Denise Connell RELATED ARTICLESMORE FROM AUTHOR The Anatomy of Fear You have entered an incorrect email address! Please enter your email address here While it’s only human nature to want to avoid thinking about unpleasant subjects, it’s important to consider what would happen if you became unable to make decisions for yourself due to incapacity or illness.An advance directive tells your doctor and caregivers what kind of care you would like to receive – even if you become unable to make medical decisions. If that should happen to you, making decisions about your medical care will be easier if you’ve previously identified someone to speak on your behalf and have expressed clear wishes about your care.These legally binding documents outline your wishes regarding life support, resuscitation and other interventions for both your health care team and family members.When should I make advance directives?Some people make advance directives when they are diagnosed with a life-threatening illness; others put their wishes in writing while they are healthy.How does it help my loved ones?Too often, when loved ones are left guessing what should be done, the result is guilt, uncertainty and arguments. By making your wishes known, you can help your loved ones feel more comfortable with your choice of care.What are the types of advance directives?There are two types of advance directives: a living will and a designation of health care surrogate form, also known as a durable power of attorney for health care. Both forms can be changed at any time, and it’s a good idea to update them periodically.Living willA living will tells your medical team and your family what treatments you want to receive or refuse, and under which conditions. Your physician and your health care surrogate are required to follow all directives in a living will.A living will is enacted only when your attending physician and a consulting physician determine that you’re: unable to make your own medical decisions and are unlikely to regain this ability; and in a terminal persistent vegetative state, an end-stage condition, or in any other condition that you specified in your living will.Is a living will the same as a DNR?No. A Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order is a separate document stating that you do not wish to be resuscitated in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest. You must discuss your desire for a DNR with the attending physician so the order can be entered into your medical record. The DNR form has to be completed by you and your physician to be valid.Designation of health care surrogateToo often, when loved ones are left guessing what should be done, the result is guilt, uncertainty and arguments.The designation of health care surrogate, also called a durable power of attorney for health care, allows you to appoint someone to make decisions on your behalf when you’re unable to do so. It’s different than a regular durable power of attorney, which only covers financial matters. Also, it’s best if you appoint someone who knows your wishes and is willing and able to carry them out, especially regarding your personal, spiritual, moral and cultural beliefs.In the event that you’re incapacitated, your health care surrogate will have the authority to make all medical decisions related to your health care. This includes decisions about when to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures. Designation of health care surrogate takes effect as soon as your physician deems that you’re unable to make your own health care decisions.Am I required to have an advance directive under Florida law?No, there’s no legal requirement to have an advance directive. However, if you haven’t made an advance directive, your health care decisions may be made for you by a court-appointed guardian; your spouse; your adult child; your adult sibling; an adult relative or a close friend. The person making decisions for you may or may not be aware of your wishes. When you make an advance directive, discuss it with your loved ones so they’re aware of your wishes.Getting startedAn attorney can be consulted to offer advice on how to tailor advance directives that best meet your wishes. However, even though advance directives are legal documents, an attorney isn’t required to write them. The only caveat is you must have two adults witness your directives, and only one of them can be a spouse or blood relative. Also, your designated health care surrogate cannot sign your advance directives.Where can I find forms?If you want to write your own, downloadable forms may be found through the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration.Can I change my mind after I write my advance directive?Yes, you can change or cancel an advance directive at any time. Your changes should be written, signed and dated. In fact, it’s a good idea to review your directives periodically and if changes are made, be sure to provide your primary care doctor with a new copy.Next stepsOnce you’ve created your advance directives, let members of your immediate family, especially your health care surrogate, know about them and where they’re located.You’ll want to share a copy with your primary care doctor to include in your medical records, and remember to provide a new copy if your directives change.Be sure to also bring a copy of your advance directives with you when you’re admitted to the hospital.Planning for the future is never easy. However, advance directives ensure your wishes are carried out when you’re unable to make sound decisions about your health care, and create peace of mind for both yourself and your loved ones. Share on Facebook Tweet on Twitter Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.
Twitter ReddIt Facebook Pantone: Color of the year 2020 Linkedin Twitter TCU News Now 4/24/20 TCU 360 is an official, student-produced product of the School of Journalism at Texas Christian University. TCU 360 Staffhttps://www.tcu360.com/author/tcu-360-staff/ Return of the disco: Latest fashion trends mirror the 1970s TCU 360 Staffhttps://www.tcu360.com/author/tcu-360-staff/ News Now 4/10/20 Previous articleWhat we’re reading: Flirting with peaceNext articleUp, up, and literally away; helium shortage impacts many TCU 360 Staff RELATED ARTICLESMORE FROM AUTHOR TCU 360 Staffhttps://www.tcu360.com/author/tcu-360-staff/ TCU News Now 8/26/20 print TCU 360 Staff ReddIt TCU 360 Staffhttps://www.tcu360.com/author/tcu-360-staff/ Linkedin Sustainability is the new green: Fashion companies work towards environmentally-conscious practices + posts Behind the runway: One TCU student’s experiences at Fashion Week Facebook
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New Mayor highlights need to respect Bloody Sunday families Man arrested in Derry on suspicion of drugs and criminal property offences released Twitter Dail hears questions over design, funding and operation of Mica redress scheme Twitter Facebook Pinterest Facebook PSNI and Gardai urged to investigate Adams’ claims he sheltered on-the-run suspect in Donegal RELATED ARTICLESMORE FROM AUTHOR Google+ Newsx Adverts By News Highland – June 8, 2010 Google+ Dail to vote later on extending emergency Covid powers Pinterest Watch: The Nine Til Noon Show LIVE WhatsApp HSE warns of ‘widespread cancellations’ of appointments next week Previous articleDoherty claims government is blind to the extent of unemployment in DonegalNext articleGilmore presents upbeat analysis of Labour’s Donegal prospects News Highland The new mayor of Derry Cllr Colm Eastwood has called for the families of the Bloody Sunday victims to be given space when the Saville Enquiry’s report is published next week.Cllr Eastwood made his comments after his election was confirmed in the Guildhall last night.Referring to next week’s publication of the Saville report, he stressed that whatever about anything else, the 15th is a day for the families. He said they must be given the space and comfort they need to digest the report and to respond in whatever way they see fit.Cllr Eastwood said he formly believes that Derry will be crowned the UK City of Culture for 2013. He said he and the council will play their part to project to the world an image of a positive, vibrant, outward-looking city.He finished by describing Derry as a city getting off its knees, and looking to the future with positivity and confidence. WhatsApp
Karnataka HC Asks BCI If It Has Powers To Relax Requirements Of Moot Courts, Internships Amid COVID-19
News UpdatesKarnataka HC Asks BCI If It Has Powers To Relax Requirements Of Moot Courts, Internships Amid COVID-19 Mustafa Plumber17 July 2020 12:39 AMShare This – xThe Karnataka High Court has directed the Bar Council of India (BCI) to clarify if it has powers to relax rules and if it has been exercised to allow Law Universities to issue alternative guidelines, to dispense the mandatory regulations for all final year students of Five Year Law Course, to engage themselves in moot courts, internships, pre-trial preparation etc, for the academic…Your free access to Live Law has expiredTo read the article, get a premium account.Your Subscription Supports Independent JournalismSubscription starts from ₹ 599+GST (For 6 Months)View PlansPremium account gives you:Unlimited access to Live Law Archives, Weekly/Monthly Digest, Exclusive Notifications, Comments.Reading experience of Ad Free Version, Petition Copies, Judgement/Order Copies.Subscribe NowAlready a subscriber?LoginThe Karnataka High Court has directed the Bar Council of India (BCI) to clarify if it has powers to relax rules and if it has been exercised to allow Law Universities to issue alternative guidelines, to dispense the mandatory regulations for all final year students of Five Year Law Course, to engage themselves in moot courts, internships, pre-trial preparation etc, for the academic year 2019-20. A division bench of Chief Justice Abhay Oka and Justice M Nagprasanna said :”Today Bar council members may have taken this decision but tomorrow we may not know what will happen. So we have to secure the future of the students.” The bench added, “Suppose a student wants to pursue education in a foreign University after completion of course and if the degree is not recognised at a later stage, it will affect their career.” The observation followed after the University of Law College, Bangalore submitted that as per the guidelines issued by UGC and as per the press note issued by the Bar Council of India onJune 9, the University has adopted alternative guidelines with regard to requirements under 24 (b) and (c) only for academic year, 2019-2020. The direction was given during the hearing of a petition filed by two law students, Gautham R and Krishnamurthy T K, students of University law college, Bangalore pursuing 5 years integrated BA LLB course. The petition states that Schedule II of Part IV of the Bar Council of India Rules outlines the academic standards and courses a legal institution needs to impart in the course of legal education. Part II (B) under Entry 6 of Schedule II of the Rules of Legal Education (Part IV of Bar Council of India Rules) provides for “Compulsory Clinical Courses” which must be conducted by the respective Universities/Institutions. Under the said Entry 6, Paper 24 pertains to “Moot Court Exercise and Internship” which reads as follows: Moot court exercise and Internship: This paper may have three components of 30 marks each and a viva for: 10 marks. (a) Moot Court (30 Marks). Every student may be required to do at least three moot courts in a year with 10 marks for each. The moot court work will be on assigned problems and it will be evaluated for 5 marks for written submissions and 5 marks for oral advocacy. (b) Observance of Trial in two cases, one Civil and one Criminal (30 marks): Students may be required to attend two trials in the course of the last two or three years of LLB. studies. They will maintain a record and enter the various steps observed during their attendance on different days in the court assignment. This scheme will carry 30 marks. (c) Interviewing techniques and Pre-trial preparations and Internship diary (30 marks): Each student will observe two interviewing sessions of clients at the Lawyer’s Office/ Legal Aid Office and record the proceedings in a diary, which will carry 15 marks. Each student will further observe the preparation of documents and court papers by the Advocate and the procedure for the filing of the suit/petition. This will be recorded in the diary, which will carry 15 marks. On account of the impending COVID-19 pandemic, the High Court has laid down certain Standard Operating Procedures for the regular functioning and operation of the Courts wherein it has been categorically laid down that the entry of Advocates’ clerks, litigants as well as any other third parties have been strictly prohibited into the premises of the courts, sans permission. In such circumstances, it would be impossible for the students of final year of law to enter the court premises and observe the court proceedings or to observe interviewing sessions of clients at a Lawyer’s Office/Legal Aid Office for the purpose of completion of the course, the petitioners contended. The Law Chambers/Firms of Advocates are also reluctant to encourage students from law schools to intern at their offices keeping in mind the principles of social distancing. The indifference and apathy at the hands of the respondents is likely to vex the mobility of the students en masse, highlighted the petitioenrs. The plea prays for direction to respondents to dispense with clause (b) and (c) of Paper 24 under Schedule II of Part IV of Bar Council of India Rules (“Rules of Legal Education”) for the academic year 2019-2020. Next Story
ColumnsPrivacy Versus Morality: An Indian Gordian Knot Faisal C K6 Sep 2020 7:38 AMShare This – xTwo years after historic judgment in Navtej Singh Johar case, an age-old debate in legal philosophy is revisitedSir Edward Coke, in his The Institutes of the Laws of England, (1628) famously said: “a man’s house is his castle” What was meant by ‘castle’ was defined in 1763 by the British Prime Minister Sir William Pitt: “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces…Your free access to Live Law has expiredTo read the article, get a premium account.Your Subscription Supports Independent JournalismSubscription starts from ₹ 599+GST (For 6 Months)View PlansPremium account gives you:Unlimited access to Live Law Archives, Weekly/Monthly Digest, Exclusive Notifications, Comments.Reading experience of Ad Free Version, Petition Copies, Judgement/Order Copies.Subscribe NowAlready a subscriber?LoginTwo years after historic judgment in Navtej Singh Johar case, an age-old debate in legal philosophy is revisitedSir Edward Coke, in his The Institutes of the Laws of England, (1628) famously said: “a man’s house is his castle” What was meant by ‘castle’ was defined in 1763 by the British Prime Minister Sir William Pitt: “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown. It may be frail – its roof may shake – the wind may blow through it – the storm may enter – the rain may enter – but the King of England cannot enter.” These pronouncements constitute the embryonic form of the concept of privacy. John Stuart Mill philosophically elaborated the right to privacy. According to Mill, both state and society posed threat to individual autonomy and the right to make choice and privacy. Mill defended the right of the individual to freedom. “it is being left to oneself; all restraints qua restraints is an evil”. In its positive sense, it meant the grant of the largest and the greatest possible amount of freedom for the pursuit of the individual’s happiness, creative impulses, energies, and for self-development. Thus, Mill excellently conceived the right to privacy, individual autonomy and rational choice. He reiterated the dichotomy of self- regarding and the other-regarding actions of individual. As far as self-regarding actions are concerned, an individual is sovereign. He argued that each individual has liberty to live as he pleased. Each individual is the best judge to assess his own interests and diversity should be honored. J.S. Mill vehemently opposed moral policing. Majority in state and society tend to project itself as the controller of social opinion and an agent of social tyranny. Social tyranny is being exercised in subtle forms like customs, conventions and mass opinion. This social tyranny obstructs the right to privacy and choice. Mill used the term individuality to mean the power or capacity of individual for critical enquiry and responsible thought. Individuality is an integral part of right to privacy and choice. To Mill, happiness means individuality and liberty. Morality as a tool of social control turns often an undue interference into individuality. Morality is normative in nature and derived from social institutions like religion. Morality belongs to the domain of society whereas law falls in the sphere of state. A violation of morality is a sin; but violation of law is an offence. Morality is directory; Laws, on the other hand, are the rules that a state mandates its citizens follow in order to regulate social life. There should be a clear-cut dichotomy of law/morality, public/private, and state/society in order to avoid the lurking of totalitarianism into social discourse. The nexus between law and morality is the subject of an age-old jurisprudential debate. The prime question is whether law should de-hyphenate from morality. Does the change in the moral ethos of society automatically reflect on law? Nikolai Korkunov (1853–1904) differentiated law from morality in his Theory of Law (1900): “the distinction between morals and law can be formulated very simply. Morality furnishes the criterion for the proper evaluation of our interests; law marks out the limits within which they ought to be confined.” From this axiom, it is plainly clear that morality and law have entirely different spheres of action. Law, generally speaking, should regulate only the public sphere and private sphere should be left to the morality. The conundrum of Law v. Morality emerged in Britain in its severe form in the post-war era. The Report of the Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (better known as the Wolfenden report, after Sir John Wolfenden, the chairman of the committee) was published in the United Kingdom in 1957 and based on the report the Sexual Offence Act 1967 was passed, decriminalising certain homosexual practices in specific circumstances. Publication of the report and the Act triggered heated debate over the theme of Law v. Morality. Intense debate followed, between HLA Hart and Sir Patrick Devlin. Wolfenden Report observed: “unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting through the agency of law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law’s business”. Lord Devlin objected this philosophy and held that the criminal law of England has from the very first concerned itself with moral principles. Devlin stated that society is held together by the invisible bonds of common thought. However, Devlin held that the law must be balanced against respect for privacy. Many decades after, in India, in Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi the Delhi High Court held that treating consensual homosexual sex between adults as a crime is a violation of fundamental rights protected by India’s Constitution. The verdict resulted in the decriminalization of homosexual acts involving consenting adults throughout India. This was later overturned by the Supreme Court of India. However the matter was re-scanned by a 5 judge bench in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India in 2018. In this case, the Supreme Court of India was asked to determine the constitutionality of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, a colonial-era law which, among other things, criminalised homosexual acts as an “unnatural offence”. On 6 September 2018, the court unanimously declared the law unconstitutional “in so far as it criminalises consensual sexual conduct between adults of the same sex”. The verdict was hailed as a landmark decision for LGBT rights in India. The Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India judgement has been a natural corollary of the Supreme Court’s landmark judgement in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs Union of India (2017). This historic judgment affirmed the constitutional right to privacy. But the Supreme Court judgement in Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India will remain dead-letters as long as the society stick upon its conservative and oppressive views on homosexuality and LGBTQ+ rights. The social stigma associated with homosexuality in India is an instance of social tyranny in J.S. Mill’s phraseology. This predicament of the LGBTQ+ community again triggers the question of morality v. law in India. In Joseph Shine vs. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court decriminalised adultery under Section 497 of IPC. Section 497 was struck down on the ground that it deprives a woman of her autonomy, dignity and privacy and that it compounds the encroachment on her right to life and personal liberty by adopting a notion of marriage which subverts true equality. This verdict too poses the conundrum of privacy versus morality. South Africa’s highest court legalised the use of cannabis by adults in private places in 2018. Similarly, a matter is pending before the Delhi High Court challenging the constitutional validity of provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) and the NDPS Rules which prohibit and criminalise the personal use of cannabis. The petition was filed by the Great Legalization Movement India Trust. All these developments again posit the conundrum of law v. morality or privacy v. morality in a conservative and hypocritic society like India. The contracting orbits of law and morality, per se, denote the expanding orbit of individuality. It is a good omen in India where totalitarianism is lurking to all spheres of life. In this sense, neither law nor morality should interfere in individual’s sexual choice. Law and morality or state and society should not be peeping toms; provided the individual is a reasonable Mx.Views are personal only. (The author is an Under Secretary to the Government of Kerala) Next Story
ColumnsInsolvency Law In Review – March 2021 Siddharth Sunil,Karan Sangani,SohamChakraborty&Akshata Singh4 May 2021 10:01 PMShare This – xThe enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (Code) has had significant ramifications on the corporate insolvency landscape. Over time, the Code has witnessed a manifold increase in litigation, and consequently in the number of decisions. This has made it difficult for insolvency practitioners to stay updated with developments in the field. The purpose of this column is to fill this gap by providing brief summaries of latest decisions, from the various fora dealing with Insolvency Law. These case summaries are not an exhaustive review of the cases under the Code; only significant rulings on the Code in the month of February 2021 have been summarized. However, this does not negate the possibility of some important decisions being missed on account of human error. Further, since the purpose of this endeavor is to keep practitioners abreast of relevant developments, the decisions summarized have not been comprehensively analyzed.Supreme Court In P. Mohanraj & Ors. v MS Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt Ltd, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that institution or continuation of a proceeding under Section 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 (‘NI Act’) would be covered within the ambit of the moratorium under S. 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘Code’). The National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) had stayed proceedings arising of criminal complaints against the corporate debtor for the dishonour of cheques. On appeal, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Delhi (‘NCLAT, New Delhi’) had set aside the NCLT’s order, while holding that a criminal law provision would not fall within the purview of ‘proceedings’ in S. 14 of the Code. Referring to the purpose of a moratorium set out in the February 2020 report of the Insolvency Law Committee, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of the moratorium was to prevent the depletion of the corporate debtor’s assets during the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’). Therefore, quasi-criminal proceedings which could possibly result in the depletion of assets as a result of having to pay compensation for the dishonor of cheques would impact the CIRP in the same manner as a suit in a civil court for the amount of debt or other liability. Hence, the Supreme Court held that the meaning of ‘proceedings’ under S.14 could not be limited to civil proceedings. The Supreme Court also observed that S. 32A (which extinguishes criminal liability with change in management), included the liability for all offences committed prior to initiation of the CIRP, including S. 138 proceedings, which would cease to be an offence qua the corporate debtor if a new management comes in. While dealing with moratorium vis-a-vis other statutes, the Supreme Court also held that the Delhi High Court’s judgment in Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. v Jyoti Structures Ltd., qua the inapplicability of moratorium to Section 34 proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Arbitration Act’), was an incorrect statement of the law. In Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India & Anr., the Supreme Court held that an application under S. 7 of the Code is maintainable against a corporate guarantor to a loan, even when the principal borrower is not a corporate person, and that the debt owed in such a case would be a “financial debt” within the meaning of S. 5(8) of the Code. The Supreme Court also observed that the status of a guarantor, being a corporate person, metamorphoses into that of corporate debtor, upon the principal borrower having defaulted in the payment of its debt. The Supreme Court further held that the limitation period for filing an application under S. 7 of the Code shall be computed afresh from the date of acknowledgement of the debt by the principal borrower from time to time, as also by the corporate guarantor. In Alok Kaushik v. Mrs. Bhuvaneshwari Ramanathan and Ors., the Supreme Court held that the NCLT has the jurisdiction under S. 60 (5)(c) of the Code to adjudicate as an insolvency cost the monetary claim of a professional (a valuer, in this case) appointed by the Resolution Professional (‘RP’) during the CIRP, even after the CIRP is set aside. The Supreme Court also observed that the NCLT’s jurisdiction is mutually exclusive from the jurisdiction of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (‘IBBI’) to penalize errant conduct of an RP pursuant to a complaint under S. 217 of the Code. In Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. & Another, the Supreme Court held that a person ineligible under S. 29A read with S. 35(1)(f) of the Code is not permitted to propose a scheme of compromise or arrangement under S. 230 of the Companies Act of 2013, when the company is undergoing liquidation under the auspices of the Code, since proposing a scheme of compromise or arrangement under S. 230 of the Companies Act of 2013 (‘Companies Act’), while the company is undergoing liquidation under the provisions of the Code, lies in a similar continuum. The Supreme Court further held that the proviso to Regulation 2B of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 (‘Liquidation Regulations’), stipulating that a person ineligible under the Code to submit a resolution plan for insolvency resolution of the corporate debtor shall not be a party in any manner to the compromise or arrangement scheme, is clarificatory in nature and constitutionally valid, and that the IBBI did not transgress its authority by inserting the proviso to Regulation 2B of the Liquidation Regulations. In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Mr. Amit Gupta and Others, the Supreme Court held that as the dispute, in the present case, pertaining to the termination of a power purchase agreement, had arisen solely on the grounds of the insolvency of the corporate debtor, the NCLT was empowered to adjudicate the dispute under S. 60(5)(c) of the Code. The Supreme Court further held that, given that the terms used in S. 60(5)(c) of the Code are of wide import, the NCLT was empowered to restrain the appellant from terminating the power purchase agreement in the factual matrix of the present case, since it was the sole contract for the sale of electricity entered into by the corporate debtor and allowing the termination of the power purchase agreement would have certainly resulted in the corporate death of the corporate debtor. Furthermore, the Supreme Court left open the broader question of the validity/invalidity of ipso facto clauses in contracts, which allow a party to terminate the contract if the counterparty enters into some form of insolvency resolution process, for legislative intervention. In Indus Biotech Private Limited v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund & Ors, the Supreme Court held that, when an application under S. 8 of the Arbitration Act is made while an application under S. 7 of the IBC is pending before the NCLT for admission, the NCLT should first decide whether the S. 7 application is to be admitted, while keeping the application under S. 8 of the Arbitration Act in abeyance. In case the application under S. 7 of the IBC is admitted by the NCLT, the proceedings under the Code become a “proceeding in rem” and the matter henceforth will not be arbitrable because of the moratorium under S. 14 of the Code. The Supreme Court further reiterated that mere filing of an application under S. 7 of the Code will not trigger the CIRP, and it is only when the NCLT admits the application upon a finding of a debt due and a default in payment that the insolvency proceedings shall commence. In A. Navinchandra Steels Private Limited Vs. SREI Equipment Finance Limited & Ors., the Supreme Court held that proceedings under Ss. 7 or 9 of the Code are independent proceedings, and hence will not be affected by any existing winding up proceeding against the corporate debtor. The Supreme Court further held that it was only in an instance where the corporate death of the company is inevitable that there could be no transfer of a winding up proceeding to the NCLT to be tried under the Code. The provisions of the Code shall prevail over the provisions of the Companies Act in the event of a conflict, since the Code is a special statute vis-a-vis the Companies Act, and also on account of the non-obstante clause in Section 238 of the Code. The Supreme Court further held that under the Companies Act, only winding up can be ordered, while under the Code a compromise can be entered into under Section 230 of the Companies Act, even when liquidation is ordered. The Supreme Court also held that the primary purpose of the Code is the revival of the corporate debtor, and that every effort should be made for such revival in larger public interest. In the matter of Sesh Nath Singh and Another v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Another, the Supreme Court held that, as S. 238A of the Code makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (‘Limitation Act’), as far as may be, applicable to proceedings before the NCLT and the NCLAT, Ss. 6, 14, 18 and any other provision of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings under the Code in the NCLT or the NCLAT, to the extent feasible. Here, the proceedings initiated by the financial creditor against the corporate debtor under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’) were stayed by the Calcutta High Court by an interim order, on the prima facie satisfaction that the proceedings initiated by the financial creditor, a co-operative bank, were without jurisdiction. In this regard, the Supreme Court stated that the expression ‘court’ in S. 14(2) would be deemed to mean any forum for a civil proceeding, including any tribunal or any forum under the SARFAESI Act, and consequently, the period from the date of institution of the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act till the date of filing of the application under S. 7 of the Code could be excluded as per S. 14 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court further noted that the exclusion of time under S. 14 of the Limitation Act shall be available, even if the proceedings before the wrong forum have not been terminated. In Kridhan Infrastructure Pvt Ltd ((Now known as Krish Steel and Trading Pvt Ltd) v. Venkatesan Sankaranarayan and Others, the Supreme Court, while rejecting the appeal of the resolution applicant and holding that the management of the corporate debtor will revert to the liquidator from the resolution applicant due to the failure of the resolution applicant to comply with the terms of the resolution plan for a period of over eight months, noted that time is a crucial facet of the scheme under the Code, and to allow proceedings to lapse into an indefinite delay will plainly defeat the object of the Code. In Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association and Others v. NBCC (India) Ltd. and Others, the Supreme Court held that in the adjudicatory process concerning a resolution plan under the Code, there is no scope for interference with the commercial aspects of the decision of the Committee of Creditors (‘CoC’), and that there is no scope for substituting any commercial term of the resolution plan approved by the CoC. The Supreme Court also noted that, only if the NCLT or the NCLAT, as the case may be, within their limited jurisdiction, found any shortcoming in the resolution plan vis-à-vis the specified parameters, would the resolution plan be sent back to the CoC, for re-submission after satisfying the parameters delineated by Code, and exposited by the court. The Supreme Court also noted that for a proper and meaningful implementation of the approved resolution plan, the payment to dissenting financial creditors as envisaged by the second part of S. 30(2)(b) of the Code could only be payment in terms of money, as the dissenting financial creditor cannot be forced to remain attached to the corporate debtor by way of provisions in the nature of equities or securities. In Kalpraj Dharamshi & Anr v Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Anr., the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, where a party invokes the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to make a bona fide challenge to NCLT proceedings for the breach of principles of natural justice, S. 14 of the Limitation Act can be invoked to extend the period of limitation to file an appeal under the Code. In the context of the process of finalisation and approval of a resolution plan, the Supreme Court also held that if the CoC approves a resolution plan accepted by RP after the due date mentioned under the Notice inviting Expression of Interest under the Code, there can be no interference with such exercise of commercial wisdom of the CoC. However, the Supreme Court also held that if a resolution applicant objects to the submission and consideration of a resolution plan beyond the specified due date, the subsequent participation of such applicant in submitting a revised resolution plan would not amount to waiver of its initial objection.National Company Law Appellate Tribunals In Kuldeep Verma v. State Bank of India and Ors., the NCLAT, New Delhi held that time is of the essence under the Code, and that the NCLT must keep the same in mind, and not delay the initiation of Liquidation proceedings, despite the lapse of 981 days since the initiation of the CIRP and the rejections of multiple proposed Resolution Plans by the CoC. The NCLAT, New Delhi further observed that it is settled law that it can exercise the same powers that are available to the NCLT, and consequently directed the initiation of Liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor. In Kolla Koteswara Rao Vs. Dr. S.K. Srihari Raju and Anr., the NCLAT, New Delhi held that the amount owed by a seller to a purchaser under an agreement of sale, wherein the purchaser as consideration had agreed to pay off the loan owed by the seller to a financial creditor, will be considered as a financial debt under S. 5(8)(f) of the Code, provided that the debt fulfills the three-fold criteria of: i) Disbursal, ii) Time value of money, and iii) Commercial effect of borrowing, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. The NCLAT, New Delhi further held that there is no requirement that the corporate debtor must utilize the money that has been disbursed. In the instant case, the money was paid by the purchaser to the lender pursuant to a one-time settlement entered into between the lender and the seller. In addition to this, the agreement of sale required the seller to refund the money to the purchaser with interest in case of failure to execute or register the sale deed. These factors were considered by the NCLAT as having satisfied the three-fold criteria required for a debt to be classified as a financial debt under S. 5(8)(f) of the Code. In Radico Khaitan Ltd. v. BT & FC Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., the NCLAT, New Delhi, following the judgment of the NCLT, Mumbai in SBI Vs Videocon Industries Ltd. allowed the consolidation of two CIRPs, since there existed i) Common control, ii) Common directors, iii) Common assets, iv) Common liabilities, v) Interdependence on each other, vi) Pooling of resources, vii) Intricate links between the companies, and viii) Common financial creditors. In the instant case, the application for consolidation of the CIRPs was made by the operational creditor of one of the corporate debtors, and was opposed on the ground that an operational creditor has no locus standi to make such an application, since the operational creditor is not a part of the CoC. However, the NCLAT refused to entertain the said objection, and on the facts of the case, found it to be a fit case for consolidation of the CIRPs. In Gabs Megacorp Limited v Sutanu Sinha & Anr., the NCLAT, Chennai held that where the impugned order by the NCLT pertained to adjournment simpliciter of two interlocutory applications, the person challenging such order could not be characterized as an Appellant aggrieved with an order within the meaning of S. 61 of the Code. In Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board v CA Jalesh Kumar Grover, the NCLAT, New Delhi held that its paramount consideration was to maintain the corporate debtor as a going concern, and that straddling the corporate debtor with heavy instalments towards clearing liabilities, even if they were incurred during the CIRP, would not benefit anyone, and could have the effect of ceasing the operations of the corporate debtor.. The Appellant was the State Electricity Board (State Board), which had assailed a direction by the NCLT ordering it to not disconnect electricity supply of the corporate debtor, as long as the monthly electricity bills were paid, along with an instalment of INR 10,00,000 (Ten Lakhs) towards payment of outstanding electricity dues during the CIRP period. The State Board challenged the said direction on the ground that the quantum of INR 10,00,000 (Ten Lakhs) per month would not be adequate towards clearing electricity dues, as the NCLT had overlooked late payment surcharge mandated by the applicable tariff order. The NCLAT, New Delhi enhanced the monthly instalment to INR 12,00,000 (Twelve Lakhs). In Indian Overseas Bank v M/S RCM Infrastructure Limited & Ors., while holding that the assets of the corporate debtor cannot be proceeded against under the SARFAESI Act after imposition of the moratorium under S. 14 of the Code, the NCLAT, New Delhi upheld the setting aside of the sale of corporate debtor’s assets under the said Act, which had been conducted before the initiation of the CIRP. The Appellant took over possession of the corporate debtor’s assets, and conducted an auction sale. The issuance of sale certificate under the SARFAESI Act, and transfer of 25% consideration towards sale of the corporate debtor’s assets, had taken place before the initiation of the CIRP. However, upon initiation of the CIRP, the Appellant had filed its claim for the entire outstanding amount, and thereafter received the balance 75% consideration towards sale of the corporate debtor’s assets. The NCLAT, New Delhi held that the sale was not complete, as the total sale price was not paid before the CIRP was initiated, and therefore the continuation of the sale process during the moratorium was illegal and liable to be set aside.National Company Law Tribunals In DMI Finance Private Limited v. M/s Abloom Infotech Pvt. Ltd., the NCLT, Delhi relied upon the judgment of the NCLAT, New Delhi in State Bank of India v. Athena Energy Pvt. Ltd., whereby the NCLAT, New Delhi departed from its previous judgment in Dr. Vishnu Kumar Agarwal v. M/s Piramal Enterprises Ltd., to hold that the CIRP could be commenced against both the guarantor and borrower simultaneously. Further, the NCLT, Delhi, relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Innoventive Industries Ltd. v ICICI Bank and Anr. to reiterate that it had a limited scope of inquiry while considering applications seeking the initiation of the CIRP by financial creditors, and that it only needed to be satisfied that a) There was a financial debt; b) A default had occurred; and c) The application is complete. In Yuvraj Agarwal and Anr. v. M/s Aspek Media Pvt. Ltd., the NCLT, Delhi, while following the NCLAT’s judgment in Uttam Galva Steels Limited v. DF Deutsche Forfait AG and Anr., held that the issuance of a Demand Notice and filing of an application under Ss. 8 and 9 of the Code, respectively, can be done by operational creditors only in their individual capacities, and not jointly. Consequently, the NCLT, Delhi dismissed an application that had been preferred under S. 9 of the Code, jointly by a individual and a company. In Sarita Jain Proprietor of Pratham Traders v. Silvertoan Papers Ltd., the NCLT, Delhi relied on the judgment of the NCLAT, New Delhi In Ishrat Ali v. Cosmos Cooperative Bank Ltd. and Anr. to hold that the limitation period of three years applies to applications filed under the Code, by virtue of Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Further, the NCLT, Delhi relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar Aluminum Industries Pvt. Ltd. to hold that a fresh computation of limitation upon an acknowledgement of liability in terms of S. 18 of the Limitation Act, is inapplicable to proceedings under S. 7 of the Code. In Amluckie Investment Co. Ltd. v. Skil Infrastructure Ltd., the NCLT, Mumbai held that S. 18 of the Limitation Act, which permits the calculation of a fresh limitation period upon acknowledgement of liability prior to the expiry of the limitation period, and S. 19 of the Limitation Act, which permits the calculation of a fresh limitation period upon payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy prior to the expiry of the limitation period, are applicable to proceedings under the Code. In the instant case, since the corporate debtor made interest payments within three years of the limitation period commencing from January 01, 2015, and continued to make such payments intermittently till March 31, 2019, the NCLT, Mumbai held that a fresh period of limitation would be computed from March 31, 2019 on account of Ss. 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act. In Gangamai Industries & Construction Limited v. Mr. Pankaj Joshi, the NCLT, Mumbai, held that the actions of the RP and the CoC of accepting the resolution plan of a resolution applicant after the expiry of the deadline for the submission of the resolution plan, which plan had earlier been rejected by the CoC, were prejudicial and beyond the scope of the Code. The NCLT, Mumbai observed that, after the expiry of the deadline for submission of the resolution plan, the RP with the approval of CoC, could have extended the timeline for submission of bids by issuing a fresh invitation for the expression of interest in order to provide a fair opportunity to all applicants to participate in the process. In Doha Bank Q.P.S.C v. Anish Nanavaty (Resolution Professional of Reliance Infratel Limited) and Others, the NCLT, Mumbai held that, when a financial debt is due, irrespective of whether the payment of the same has been defaulted or not, a claim can be made to the interim resolution professional (‘IRP’)/RP during the CIRP. The NCLT, Mumbai noted that if the proposition of the applicant, viz. that no claim can be made before the IRP/RP until the payment of the debt has been defaulted, is accepted, it would lead to a situation where only the defaulted debts of the creditors can be claimed, and the other creditors will end up remediless. The NCLT, Mumbai also rejected the contention of the applicant that the individual lenders, who had a beneficial interest in but not a legal title to the security (which vested with the security trustee) under the deed of hypothecation, were not entitled to file claims with the IRP/RP, holding that filing a claim before the IRP/RP cannot be construed as tantamount to enforcement of security interest. In Doha Bank Q.P.S.C v. Manish Dhirajlal Kaneria, (Insolvency Resolution Professional of Reliance Infratel Limited) and Others, the NCLT, Mumbai reiterated that the Code is a self-contained legislation providing for a specific procedure for the collation of claims, and that neither the RP nor any authority under the Code can deviate from the procedure prescribed thereunder. Consequently, the NCLT, Mumbai noted that without proper submission of documents before the IRP, and without proper verification by the IRP, the respondents could not be deemed as the financial creditors of the corporate debtor. The court further noted that the transactions covered under the corporate guarantees in question would not come within the purview of preferential transactions within the meaning of S. 43 of the Code, since the execution of the corporate guarantees was not a transfer of property or an interest of the corporate debtor for the benefit of one of its creditors or a body thereof. In Mahavir Interchem, through its proprietor, Samir Kumbhani v. Lakeland Chemicals (India) Limited, the NCLT, Mumbai held that the eligibility of a person for taking part in any process or activity under the Code has to be taken into consideration as per the timeline provided in the Code for such activity or participation. In the instant case, the NCLT, Mumbai allowed the application of the suspended director and promoter of the corporate debtor, to submit a resolution plan for the corporate debtor, as the applicant was freed from the ineligibility prescribed under S. 29A(c) of the Code, as on the stipulated timeline of the date of the submission of the resolution plan, i.e., 01.07.2020 the corporate debtor had been categorized as a micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME), vide the Central Government’s notification dated 01.06.2020. In M/S Ranasaria Poly Pack Pvt. Ltd v. M/S Uniworld Sugars Private Limited, the NCLT, Allahabad held that it is a settled position of law that the commercial wisdom of a resolution plan is not open to judicial review; and that, as long as the resolution plan meets the requirements of S. 30(2) of the Code, it would be considered valid.Siddharth is an advocate based out of Delhi. Karan is an advocate based out of Mumbai. Soham is pursuing his B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) programme at NALSAR University of Law. Akshata is an advocate based out of Delhi. The present compilation represents the exclusive work of the authors in their personal capacities, and is not linked to any of the institutions/firms that they may be associated with. TagsInsolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (Code) Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 (‘NI Act’) National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) Next Story
DeeMair, IPC Media’s HR director, has been appointed to the board. She joined IPCin September 2003 and will continue to be responsible for the company’s HR andlearning and development departments. She will also assume responsibility forcorporate communications. Mair has more than 20 years’ HR experience gainedwithin a variety of different industries. PatOwens has joined HR outsourcing solutions provider Outset as a seniorconsultant. Owens will be providing an ‘in-client’ HR service to Outset’stechnology and financial services sector clients, and will lead a team ofreward, resourcing and employment law consultants.LaingO’Rourke, the international construction group, has appointed Denise Kingsmillto create and chair a new innovative advisory forum. Kingsmill is the formerdeputy chair of the Competition Commission and led the Accounting for PeopleTaskforce. The aim of the forum will be to turbo-charge the company’s drive tobecome a world-class construction group.Recruitmentconsultancy, Shorterm Group, has promoted 10 of its management team followingits financial year-end business review, including promoting Peter Kent todirector of HR and training. On the moveOn 27 Jul 2004 in Personnel Today Related posts:No related photos. Previous Article Next Article Comments are closed.